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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter sketches what is considered the best interpretation of
physicalism, rehearses the best way of defending it, and shows that the
physicalism forthcoming is still going to be less than fully satisfying; it is
going to leave us short of the satisfaction that might be expected from
a philosophical theory. The chapter is organized into three sections. The
first section gives an interpretation of physicalism in the spirit of Frank
Jackson's; this involves a rich version under which the way things are
phenomenally is derivable in principle from physical premisses. The second
sketches a representationalist or intentionalist argument for physicalism
about phenomenal experience, one which also appeals to Jackson. The third
section argues that even if we accept this case for a rich physicalism, still we
should not expect to find the doctrine fully satisfying; the simulatory gap will
stand between us and a sort of satisfaction that we might have expected to
achieve.
Keywords:   Frank Jackson, physicalism, physical premisses, phenomenal experience
Introduction
No philosopher can afford to neglect physicalism. Even if the doctrine is
not correct, it represents the worst‐case scenario—and hence the most
challenging hypothesis—under which to think about a variety of phenomena
that interest philosophers, ranging from freedom and phenomenal
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experience and personal identity to meaning and value and social
aggregation. Those who are drawn to physicalism will need to show either
that we can live with the denial of those phenomena or that the phenomena
would be realized, at least to a close approximation, in a physicalist world.
And those who go for some form of dualism or emergentism or the like will
need to demonstrate why the counterparts that might survive in a physicalist
world do not constitute the real thing.1
My aim here is to sketch what I see as the best interpretation of physicalism,
rehearse what I regard as the best way of defending it, and then show that
the physicalism forthcoming is still going to be less than fully satisfying; it
is going to leave us short of the satisfaction that might be expected from a
philosophical theory. We may think that everything is physically constituted
and physically governed, and that in principle it is possible to derive the way
things are in any other respect from the way they are in physical respects;
this is supported by my interpretation of the doctrine. But still physicalism
will always seem to short‐change us; it will leave us unsatisfied. While I think
that the lesson is of more general significance, I shall try to substantiate
it here with reference only to the physicalist treatment of phenomenal
experience.
(p. 164 ) The problem I see is that no matter how convinced one is of the
truth of physicalism, the doctrine is incapable of being absorbed into one's
daily life; the phenomena to which experience testifies cannot be made to
present themselves in the shape that they have according to that theory.
Thus, one can never come to see what transpires in phenomenal experience
—in the experience of colour, taste, feel and so on—as physically derivable
and unexceptionable. There will always be a gulf between the theoretical
acceptance of its physical character and the experience itself.
The problem I allege is not that we are incapable of making physical sense of
phenomenal experience, whether because of shortcomings in our cognitive
architecture (McGinn 1993, 1999), or because of lacking certain crucial
concepts (Stoljar 2001). Nor does the problem arise just from the fact that
we are subject to a limitation of perceptual processing such as that whereby
one of the two lines in the Mueller‐Lyer illusion continues to look longer,
even when we realize they are of the same length (Fodor 1983). It is a
problem more troublesome than the latter, less dramatic than the former.
I describe it, for reasons that will become clear later, as a problem in our
simulatory capacities, characterizing it as a simulatory gap that parallels
the explanatory gap postulated by Joseph Levine (1993). I believe that the
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simulatory gap is troublesome in a range of areas—I comment on this in a
brief conclusion—but I shall mainly be concerned with it here in relation to
the physicalist account of phenomenal experience.
My paper is in three sections. In the first section, I give an interpretation
of physicalism in the spirit of Frank Jackson's (1998) treatment; this
involves a rich version under which the way things are phenomenally
is derivable in principle from physical premisses. In the second I sketch
a representationalist or intentionalist argument for physicalism about
phenomenal experience, one which also appeals to Jackson (2003). And
then in the third section I argue that even if we accept this case for a rich
physicalism, still we should not expect to find the doctrine fully satisfying;
the simulatory gap will stand between us and a sort of satisfaction that we
might have expected to achieve.
The existence of the simulatory gap may be bad news for physicalism, so far
as it points up the lack of satisfaction in prospect. But I should mention that
in another way it is clearly good news for the doctrine. Ignore the inevitability
of the simulatory gap and physicalism may be expected to do the impossible,
and so may be held to unreachable standards of proof. Admit the simulatory
gap, however, and everything changes. The less physicalism is expected to
achieve, the more plausible and palatable it may be found.
(p. 165 ) 1. A Rich Physicalism
Going just on our folk understanding of looks, and tastes, and feels—our
ordinary sense of phenomenal experiences—we can apparently conceive of
the actual world being physically unchanged, while there are variations in
such experiences. We can conceive of the experiences assuming a different
form, as in red‐green inversions of colour appearances; or perhaps of
their not materializing at all, as in the colour‐blind functioning of zombie
counterparts (Chalmers 1996). The conceivability of such independent
variation is apparently boosted by the fact that equally we can conceive
of someone knowing all that there is physically to know—knowing all the
physical facts—and yet not knowing how a colour looks, a food tastes, a
burn feels, and so on. Such a physically omniscient but still epistemically
deprived individual is exemplified by the figure of Frank Jackson's Mary, the
all‐knowing scientist who lives in a wholly black and white world (Jackson
1982, 1986).2
The apparent conceivability of phenomenal‐physical variation jars with the
physicalist ontology that natural science makes attractive. Physicalism holds,
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intuitively, that the way the world physically is—there are some variations in
how ‘physical’ may be understood (Pettit 1993b)—fixes the way that it is in
other respects. It fixes what there is and it fixes how what there is behaves
or functions. There could not be a world that was exactly like ours in the way
it is physically constituted, then, and yet varies from ours in how it otherwise
is or behaves. Or at least there could not be such a physically indiscernible,
otherwise varying world, short of something new being added there. In Frank
Jackson's (1998) formulation, there could not be a minimal physical duplicate
of the actual world that was not also a duplicate in other respects, including
the phenomenal respects relating to how things look and feel, smell and
taste, and so forth.
Under one natural family of views as to what is involved in finding a scenario
conceivable, there is going to be a straight inconsistency between the
conceivability of phenomenal‐physical variation and a physicalist ontology
of this kind.3 On the sort of view I have in mind, our use of a phenomenal
term is driven by a conception of what is required for the term to apply: a
conception of the conditions that anything must satisfy in order to deserve to
(p. 166 ) have the term used of it. To be able to conceive that a phenomenal
term might apply differently in a physically indiscernible duplicate of the
actual world, then—and, presumptively, to be able to do this in the absence
of ignorance or error4—will be to reveal a conception of what is required
for it to apply that outruns any physical specification. It will be to show
that according to the way one thinks of the experience to which the term
applies—and so according to the way anyone who shares that conception
thinks5—the experience does not fit the physicalist bill; it can vary while the
physical world remains the same. Put in the first person, it will be to find
it a priori knowable—knowable on the basis of the conceptions that drive
the terms one uses—that the phenomenal experiences in question can vary
independently of how things physically are.6
Some philosophers try to resolve the physicalist problematic by rejecting
this conception‐driven picture of what explains why certain terms—in
particular, phenomenal terms—apply to certain items. They say that the
ability to conceive of a phenomenal term applying differently in a physically
indiscernible world does not reveal a conception of what is required for
it to apply; and so not a conception that makes the requirements out to
be non‐physical. On this view, phenomenal terms refer, not to items that
satisfy associated conceptions in the minds of relevant users, but to things
that satisfy conditions of which users may not have any conception or
inkling: say, to the items that happen to figure in the causal origin of the
Page 5 of 29 Consciousness and the Frustrations of Physicalism
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2012.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: null; date:
28 January 2013
usage of the terms, whether or not users are aware of the fact, or to items
that correlate causally with certain exemplars of continued usage, again
without users having to be aware of that fact. The idea is that the terms one
learns offer immediately available tags—opponents would say, mysteriously
available tags—whereby one can keep empirical track of things. From the
point of view of a user, these tags attach directly to the things they refer
to, not by virtue of those things satisfying associated conceptions; they
attach to their referents sub‐cognitively, via a mechanism that operates
independently of anything that has to be accessible to a user.
On this account of why phenomenal terms attach to certain items, nothing is
a priori knowable in the sense in play earlier, since there are no associated 
(p. 167 ) conceptions to be explored for what they leave open and for
what they rule out (Stalnaker 2004). Thus we cannot say that it is a priori
knowable that the phenomenal can vary independently of the physical
and we cannot say, in the associated strict sense, that it is conceivable
that the phenomenal should vary in that way. But what we can say, of
course, is that it is not a priori knowable that the phenomenal cannot vary
independently and in that weaker sense we can say that it is conceivable
that the phenomenal should vary. And this is in fact what a number of
physicalists do assert, evading the problem raised by the clash of claims
with which we began. They hold that while we may be able to conceive
of the phenomenal varying independently of the physical, that proves
absolutely nothing; it is quite consistent with the phenomenal being fixed, as
a matter of empirical fact, by the physical. Indeed it is even consistent with
various identities holding, and so holding of necessity, between phenomenal
experiences and certain neural processes.7
In this paper I am going to assume a conception‐driven story as to what
makes phenomenal terms pick out corresponding items of experience. With
most terms in our language, and certainly with terms of the phenomenal
sort, I think that we hold ourselves answerable to antecedent conceptions
of what is required to make something the deserver of such a term. The
associated conceptions may vary among us and may shift over time but they
serve at any time, for any person, as criteria by which he or she is required
to navigate.
Thus, we are not normally at a loss if we are asked what a term would
refer to, according to our guiding conception, were we to inhabit a world
that is different in various ways from the actual one. We are able to help
ourselves in such an inquiry to a conception of what matters in determining
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the referent, and we can make a fairly confident judgment on how the term
would apply did we inhabit that varying world. Take the term ‘water’ and
imagine that the actual world is one in which a substance, XYZ, plays the
role played here by H2O: it falls from the sky, fills the oceans, is potable and
transparent and so on. We can be quite confident in judging that were the
actual world like that—were it a world where XYZ had all the properties that
make H2O a deserver of the name ‘water’ in our world—then in the scenario
envisaged ‘water’ would refer to XYZ. The background idea here is already 
(p. 168 ) in Locke (1975, Bk 3, ch. 2, sect. 2). ‘Words being voluntary signs’,
he said of the ordinary speaker, ‘they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by
him on things he knows not.’ (See too Jackson and Pettit 1998).
In assuming a conception‐driven story as to why phenomenal terms have
their particular referents, I am taking the side, broadly,8 of Frank Jackson
and David Chalmers (2001) in a recent debate with Ned Block and Robert
Stalnaker (2000). I find the approach attractive, as just mentioned, but
in any case there is strategic reason for assuming it here. Under the
approach in question physicalism is an intuitively richer doctrine than
under the alternative, for it requires us to deny the conceivability of
phenomenal‐physical variation, not just to deflate it. The claim in this
version of physicalism is that it is in principle possible to derive how things
phenomenally are from how they are physically: there is an entailment, in
principle knowable on an a priori basis, from the physical to the phenomenal.
What I want to argue here is that even if such a rich physicalism is
vindicated, still physicalism will remain less than a wholly satisfying doctrine;
it will still be subject to the problem of the simulatory gap.
Those of us who are rich physicalists often complain that the weaker version
of the doctrine would be unsatisfying in not being able to invoke a priori
conceptions of phenomenal experiences to justify equating the experiences
with certain physical processes. But the fact is, so I want to argue, that our
own version of physicalism is not going to be fully satisfying either and we
should not raise expectations that we cannot hope to meet. In what follows,
then, I will be concerned only with rich physicalism, as I have been calling it,
though I shall usually leave that to be understood.
2. A Case for Rich Physicalism
With rich physicalism characterized, we might go straight to the argument
as to why it cannot deliver a certain sort of satisfaction. But that argument
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will be easier to appreciate if we first sketch out the kind of case that can be
made in favour of physicalism.
In what I think of as the most persuasive case available, there are two
steps. First, the qualitative character of phenomenal experience—the
character  (p. 169 ) that ensures there is ‘something it is like’ to undergo
the experience (Nagel 1986)—is said to be fixed by its representational
properties. And, second, the representational properties of an experience
are said to be fixed by broadly the same sorts of determinants—for example,
functional factors—that are taken to fix the representational properties of
non‐phenomenal representations: say, beliefs and judgments. The approach,
pioneered in recent times by Gilbert Harman (1990), and promoted also by
Michael Tye (2000) and Frank Jackson (2003), is sometimes described as
representationalism or intentionalism.
The representational properties of a state include both what is represented
to be the case—the content of the state—and the manner in which it is
represented to be the case (Chalmers 2004). The manner of representation
is what marks off experiences from memories and beliefs and a common
view is that it is fixed by the way the state functions. A state will count
as experiential so far as it functions in a manner typical of experiences: it
generally disposes an agent to come to believe that things are as they are
represented to be; it does not control behaviour except when it leads to
belief; it may remain in place, continuing to represent things as being thus
and so, even when the subject has to come to believe that they are not that
way (Fodor 1983); and so on. Assuming that the manner of representation is
fixed in these ways, and that we can identify a state as an experience, the
focus among intentionalists is, first, how the content of an experience fixes
its phenomenal character; and, second, how that content is fixed in turn by
physical determinants.
I sketch the intentionalist approach in this section, thereby setting up a
version of physicalism that will allow us to see, in the next section, where the
simulatory gap makes trouble. The gap makes trouble for non‐intentionalist
counterparts of rich physicalism too, but that point is best made when we
have seen how it disturbs the intentionalist variant.
The First Intentionalist Claim
The first step in the intentionalist argument for physicalism is to hold that
amongst creatures of our kind its content fixes the phenomenal character
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of an experience, whatever that happens to be. This is best construed as a
supervenience thesis, according to which it is impossible for the phenomenal
character of an experience of ours to vary over time, or for the phenomenal
character of two experiences to vary between them, without a variation in
their representational properties (Byrne 2001). The notion of phenomenal
character may be left relatively vague for our purposes; it is intended to
refer to whatever is involved in there being something it is like to have an
experience. But the notion of content requires a number of comments.
(p. 170 ) First comment. The content of an experience is how the experience
represents things as being. It consists in the properties that the experience
represents as being instantiated, perhaps on or in the subject's body,
perhaps at this or that direction and distance from it. The properties it
represents as instantiated in this way may not actually be instantiated,
of course. Indeed, they may even be wholly illusory. Those philosophers
who think that, in attributing colours and tastes to things in the physical
world, sensory experience is necessarily in error can still hold that it is in
virtue of representing such non‐physical properties as instantiated that the
experiences have their particular phenomenal character.
Second comment. The content of experience in virtue of which the
phenomenal character is said to be fixed involves only narrow properties.
They are those properties that will be available to be ascribed in the
experience of any members of our kind who are indiscernible from the
epidermis in; that is, in the experience of a number of doppelgänger. All
experience involves the ascription of such narrow properties, so I assume,
even if it serves also to ascribe properties of a wide nature (Jackson and
Pettit 1992). The reason for the restriction to narrow properties is that it
is counter‐intuitive to think that phenomenal character might vary, say as
between the experiences of two people, without there being any difference
within those subjects.
Third comment. The properties represented as instantiated must be
represented as instantiated in the world on which the agent acts, not in the
insulated realm of sense‐data imagined in some philosophical theories. This
is to say that intentionalism, as I conceive of it, rejects sense‐datum theory
(pace Byrne 2001).
Many of the properties represented by experience will be represented
as being instantiated in the external world. That such properties are not
represented as instantiated in a realm of sense‐data shows up in the fact
that if the subject finds that the properties are not instantiated in the
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external world, then there is no suggestion that therefore they must be
instantiated mentally. ‘From the fact that there is no Fountain of Youth’, as
Gilbert Harman (1990, 36) puts it, ‘it does not follow that Ponce de Leon was
searching for something mental.’ Notice, however, that though I may learn
that the external world is not as my experience represents it—the stick in
water is not bent, the lemon in the shade is not brown—still, my experience
of it as being thus or so may remain: it may still represent the stick as bent,
the lemon as brown.
Other properties represented in experience will be represented as
instantiated, not in the world, but in or on the subject's body. And here again,
if the subject finds that they are not instantiated there, then there is no
suggestion  (p. 171 ) that they must therefore be instantiated somewhere
else. From the fact that there is nothing touching my back, it does not
follow that I was tickled by something mental. There is a sense in which I
may continue to feel tickling, it is true, even as I learn that there is no one
tickling me. But that's just because the experience represents things in a
manner that is resistant to correction by belief: this, in the way an external
experience can continue to represent a lemon as brown, even when I know it
is yellow.9
The three comments so far stipulate that for intentionalism the content of
an experience is how it represents things to be in the world of the subject's
environment or body, where the way it represents them involves narrow
properties only and may be the product of a mistake or an illusion. But there
are three further comments that should be added in order to specify more
exactly the claim made; they are important, by my lights, for making the
intentionalist argument plausible.
Fourth comment. The properties represented in experience as being
instantiated are always represented at the same time as impacting on
the subject: as exercising a causal influence. What my sight represents
in the object I apparently see, it represents as, precisely, properties I can
see: properties I register only so far as my eyes are open, there is nothing
in the way, I am suitably near the object, and so on. I do not find myself
representing relevant properties as instantiated, I know not how; I do not
find myself inclined to believe that they are instantiated in the way in which
blind‐sighted subjects might come to believe this. Experiential representation
gives the subject information, not just on how things putatively are, but also
on their presenting themselves as being that way; it represents them, not
just as present, but also as presented.10
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Fifth comment. The content of a typical experience is dense and textured
in such a way that it is unlikely to be able to figure as the content of an 
(p. 172 ) independent belief or judgment: that is, a belief or judgment that
does not consist just in endorsing the experience. Thus, the content of
experience is holistically textured, so that of necessity colour is never
represented without the simultaneous representation of shape, the volume
of a sound is never represented without a representation of its pitch,
the quality of a pain I never represented without a representation of its
location, and so on (Jackson 2003). And, again, the content of experience
is often densely textured, so that it can be exploited to resolve further and
further questions of detail: we can go back to the experience to determine
previously unnoticed matters such as the exact relations of shade among
colours (Dretske 1999).
Sixth comment. The notion of content available for intentionalists is not only
a content represented in the subject, as that is sometimes put; it is a content
also represented for the subject (cf. Cummins 1983). What this means,
by my lights, is the following. Not only does an experience with a certain
content dispose an agent to act and react in a manner that is appropriate for
a world answering to that content: say, in a manner that would satisfy the
subject's desires in such a world. The subject, or at least the human subject,
is also enabled to form beliefs about that content, making judgments on
whether it is likely to be true, on how exactly it depicts this or that aspect of
the scenario involved, on whether it answers to the subject's wishes, and so
on (Pettit 1993a, ch. 2). The subject is able to meta‐represent the content
of the experience in the non‐experiential way associated with belief and
judgment. This capacity may require the sort of conceptual sophistication
that human beings have and that at least most non‐human animals seem
to lack (cf. Carruthers 2000). But it is undoubtedly an aspect of what we
naturally think of as experiential content.
With the notion of experiential content explicated in these ways, we can
return to the first claim in the intentionalist argument for physicalism.
Assuming that experiences are distinguished functionally, the claim is that
the phenomenal character of any experience of ours superveniently depends
on its content. And the argument for that thesis is fundamentally an appeal
to intuition or thought‐experiment. Can you imagine an experience of yours
retaining its experiential content, in the rich sense explicated, but varying in
its phenomenal character? Can you imagine it continuing to represent things
to be a certain way—the same way in all relevant details—while, suddenly,
there is something different it is like to have that experience?
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I am going to assume that the answer to this question is negative and that
the first intentionalist claim is sound (Byrne 2001). I think that however
quick, the line is fairly persuasive. We can imagine all sorts of differences
between experiences that may seem at first to have nothing to do with
content: for  (p. 173 ) example, the difference that consists in something
now being sharply presented, now being seen only in a blurry way; now
being at the centre of attention, now being unattended to. But in all such
cases it appears that the difference can be readily explained in content
terms. Thus, the sharp vision of the object represents it as having various
properties that the blurry vision fails to do; and similarly for the perception
that attends to the object and the perception that does not. In such cases
there may sometimes be differences in the other direction as well, though
intentionalism does not require this; the blurry vision may represent the
object as being at a distance, in bad light, out of focus, or whatever. I think
that most candidate counter examples can be rejected on similar grounds
and that the first intentionalist claim, properly understood, is very hard to
reject.
The Second Intentionalist Claim
The second intentionalist claim is that just as the content of an experience
fixes its phenomenal character, so various familiar sorts of determinants—
in particular, physically unexceptionable determinants—can serve to fix that
content. If this second claim goes through, of course, then physicalism will be
vindicated. For if the physical determinants of content also fix phenomenal
character, then there is no possibility of phenomenal‐physical variation. The
way the actual world is physically configured will fix the way it is configured
in all phenomenal respects as well.
There are a variety of theories as to what the determinants of content are
but by most accounts they include functional determinants, and I shall
concentrate exclusively on these. If we can see how functional determinants
might plausibly be held to fix content and character, then it will be easier
again to see how functional determinants might do so in combination with
other factors.
On the functionalist account I envisage, the content of an experience will
be fixed by what the experience does. It will be fixed by what it does under
various inputs, as those inputs give rise to the experience, or cause it to
disappear, or make it shift in various ways; by what it does in producing
corresponding outputs, where these may range from more or less autonomic
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adjustments to the judgments and actions it leads us to endorse; and by
what it does in interacting in different ways with other experiences, with
other memories and fancies and feelings, with other beliefs and desires, and
so on. The content will be superveniently dependent on the functional profile
displayed by the experience.
The idea is that an experience as of something red, for example, will count
as an experience with that content just in virtue of what it does in such  (p.
174 ) respects: say, to consider a veridical case, what it does in enabling the
subject to track an object in a certain way; to see it as similar in that way to
some objects, and different from others; and to do all of this under variations
of background, lighting and perspective (for further detail, see Pettit 2003).11
Any experience (as) of an object that does all of these things will count from
an external point of view as a perception as of red: it will lead us to say that
the subject is perceiving the object as red. And, more importantly, it will
count as a perception that from the point of view of the subject is just as a
perception of red ought to be; its content and phenomenal character will
have the distinctive aspect of such an experience.
Or perhaps not quite. As described so far, the functional profile of the
perception can be the same in human beings and in less complex animals.
But we saw that in human beings experiences represent things for the
subject as well as in the subject; they represent things in such a way that the
experiential content is available to be interrogated and considered in various
non‐experiential modes. This points us towards the need for enriching the
picture further.
The richer picture has to make room for the fact that any human subject
who is prompted and primed in the manner that goes with having a red
experience will thereby be positioned to recognize the content of the
experience, now in this perception, now in that, and now in memory, now in
imagination. The subject will be able, in virtue of that prompting and priming,
to recognize how the experience represents things to be. So far as each
perception as of red is functionally equivalent to other perceptions as of red,
and despite any independent, lower‐level variation between the experiences,
there will be a way that it represents things to be that is available as an item
about which the subject is in a position to form judgments, beliefs, and other
attitudes.
There is nothing mysterious involved in this enriched picture. All that is
required is that the functional profile of a phenomenal experience be richer
than the profile that would materialize in a conceptually unsophisticated
Page 13 of 29 Consciousness and the Frustrations of Physicalism
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2012.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: null; date:
28 January 2013
creature. The experience will have to be functionally effective, not just in
facilitating the sort of tracking and categorization mentioned earlier, but
also  (p. 175 ) the formation of judgments and beliefs, and associated other
attitudes, about how things are according to the experience. Even those who
would reject the rich physicalism envisaged here admit that such a functional
enrichment of experience is unproblematic.12
Not only will the suitably tuned human subject undergo experiences as
of red, then. He or she will also be able to think about the redness that
the experiences ascribe to things, attending to the contrast with other
colours that might have been represented, to the likelihood that the colour
represented is the real colour, and so on. The subject will be able to think
about that redness represented in experience as the red look that things
have, recognizing that the way such experiences represent things to be—
the property‐of‐the‐object‐according‐to‐the‐experiences—may not be a way
they actually are. And such red looks will have a robust presence for the
subject—they will have the status of familiar appearances—since experience,
as we noted earlier, often continues to represent things as being a certain
way, even when the subject has come to believe that as a matter of fact they
are not really that way. Although I know that the stick in water is not really
bent, the lemon in the shade is not really brown, the tickling on my back
is not really someone tickling me, still the experiences involved persist in
representing things that way.
Generalizing from the perception of colour, then, the key idea in this
physicalist story is that phenomenal experience comes about in a physical
subject in virtue of the following factors:
• the subject has experiences that represent certain
properties as present, and as presented, in the world or in
his or her own body;
• the experiences play this representational role in virtue of
being tuned appropriately to world or body and in virtue of
tuning the subject to respond, or be disposed to respond,
appropriately;
• the experiences represent the corresponding properties for
the subject, not just in the subject, so far as he or she is able
to think about the properties as experientially represented;
and
• the experiences often represent those properties in a way
that is resistant to correction in the light of belief, so that the
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properties‐as‐experientially‐represented have the character
of robust appearances.
What will make an experience distinctively phenomenal, on this account?
What will ensure that there is something it is like to undergo the experience?
(p. 176 ) The first thing to say is that whenever an experience represents
something in a subject, there will be something the world or its body is like
from the viewpoint of that subject (Dretske 1995). The animal or human in
question will be positioned to think about the world or body on the basis of
how it is represented, where the way it is represented—its content—is highly
distinctive. Experiential content, as we have seen, is distinctive so far as
properties are represented, not just as present, but also as presented; and so
far as it is holistically and densely textured.
But it is one thing for there to be something the experienced world is like
from the viewpoint of a subject; it is another for there to be something
the experience itself is like. On the story told, this will most naturally be
identified with the experience's coming to represent how things are for the
subject, not just in the subject: with its enabling the subject, not just to
represent things a certain way, but to think about how things are thereby
represented. When that point is reached, and only then, it will be appropriate
to say that the subject can be aware as such of looks and tastes, and feels
and smells. At that point it will be possible for the subject to think about
what different experiences as of red have in common; to contrast them with
experiences as of green; to savour the charming or eye‐catching effect of
perceived redness; to wonder about what gives rise to it in the physical
world; and so on.
The two intentionalist theses point us towards a version of physicalism.
They suggest that there is a way I functionally am in virtue of my physical
make‐up such that it guarantees that I have experiences with a distinctive
set of contents and a distinctive phenomenal character. The suggestion is
that the way things physically are will necessitate or entail the way they are
phenomenally; and this, for reasons that we can understand in virtue of our
a priori, intentionalist conception of the phenomenal states involved. I find
this rich form of physicalism plausible and attractive and I think that it fits
well with what we are learning from psychology and neuroscience (for more
in defence, see Pettit 2003).13
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(p. 177 ) 3. The Simulatory Gap
Under the rich physicalist doctrine sketched in the last section, the
physical facts about any subjects—including perhaps facts about their
environment and history—will fix the phenomenal facts that are true
of them. Were we able to survey all the physical facts, then, and had
we shared the conceptions of phenomenal reality deployed in the story
—conceptions relating the phenomenal to the representational to the
functional—then presumably we would be able to see that such and such
a physical configuration amounts to nothing more or less than such and
such a phenomenal profile. We would be able to derive the phenomenal
configuration from the physical, given the a priori conceptions of the
phenomenal in play and the empirical facts about how the physical is
configured. The lesson of the doctrine is that while we cannot actually
derive the phenomenal from the physical, not having access to the relevant
physical facts, we can see that in principle the phenomenal is derivable from
the physical (see Jackson 1998, 2003).
This conclusion, if we accept it, ought to drive out any physicalistic mystery
attaching to the notion of phenomenal experience. And yet, so it seems
to me, it doesn't quite succeed—at least not at an intuitive level. What I
hold of the phenomenal in saying that it is derivable from the physical,
is the sort of thing that I hold of the Mona Lisa's smile in saying that it is
derivable—derivable in principle but not in practice—from the exact array
of painted points found in Leonardo's painting. But whereas my belief about
the Mona Lisa leaves no mystery in place as to how such and such dots
could constitute exactly this representation of a smile, there is a certain
mystery still remaining as to why such and such a physical make‐up should
constitute precisely this sort of phenomenal experience: for example,
precisely this experience as of red. Why should the satisfaction of the
appropriate physical and functional conditions necessitate the presence of
that sui generis experience? Why should it leave open no possibility of things
looking otherwise?
I devote this last section to a discussion of that question. My hypothesis is
that notwithstanding the similarities between the physicalist claim and the
claim about the Mona Lisa's smile, there is an important difference. While
I cannot survey all the painted dots in the Mona Lisa's smile—at least not
independently of seeing the smile itself—and so cannot derive the smile
from them, I am familiar in other cases with how the addition of dot after
dot can suddenly give rise to a figure of a certain kind. Nothing of that sort
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holds in the physicalist case. Not only can I not survey all the physical facts
relevant to having such and  (p. 178 ) such a phenomenal experience, I have
no familiarity with other cases where piling up physical facts—or realizing
them in one's own person—suddenly gives rise to a phenomenal experience.
It is this difference between the cases that makes for the lack of satisfaction
associated with physicalism. So at any rate I wish to argue.
Being able to derive a conclusion from certain premisses involves, in the
normal situation, satisfying two distinct conditions (Pettit 1998). First, one
is able to inspect and understand the premisses. And second, one feels
compelled in virtue of that inspection and understanding to affirm the
conclusion: one is inferentially moved to endorse it, as a relevant habit of
inference is engaged by the premisses. Thus, in the case of a regular modus
ponens argument, one recognizes that if p, q, and that p, and the syntactic
structure of those premisses activates a primitive compulsion, as Christopher
Peacocke (1992) describes it, to go to the conclusion that q. Or, to take a
rather different case, one sees that it is beginning to rain and, aware of
one's friend's habits, one can't help concluding that she probably won't
want to go for a walk. One does not leap to conclusions in any such normal
case of reasoning and inference; one is decidedly pushed. The experience
of inference, like the experience of perception, is one of being driven to
conclusions, not an experience of willing oneself to accept them.
But while this is what happens in the normal case, it does not happen in all.
There are many exceptional or marginal cases where one believes that the
premisses support the conclusion, but the experience of the inferential push
is absent. Consider, for example, cases like the following (McGeer and Pettit
2002):
• I recognise that modus ponens is a sound rule of inference
but, perhaps because of a cognitive ailment or limitation,
I just do not feel pushed by premisses of the appropriate
form; I have to exercise brute‐force in order to regulate my
belief‐formation.
• I am learning to fly and know that the instrument readings
before me imply that the plane is heading towards the
ground but, proprioceptive cues still having a grip on my
inclinations, I have to fight hard to internalize and act on
that lesson.
• I recognize that the chance of a fair coin coming up heads
on a fair toss is a half but, confronted with a run of tails,
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I have to struggle to form the correct expectation; the
gambler's fallacy induces the illusion that on the next toss
the chance of heads is much higher than a half.
These cases illustrate a sort of malaise with which all of us are familiar in
some areas. Whether in the sphere of geometrical representations, or X‐
ray  (p. 179 ) photographs, or quantificational formulae, or perhaps just facial
expressions, most of us know what it is to believe that the fact that things
are thus and so has such and such an implication, without that implication
having any life or force for us. Psychologists speak of perceptual pop‐out in
connection with those dot‐by‐dot drawings where one may or may not see a
particular pattern. By analogy we might speak here of inferential pop‐out or
rather of the lack of inferential pop‐out. People who stare blankly at modus
ponens premisses and have to drill themselves into seeing what is implied
suffer from the lack of inferential pop‐out. So do the trainee pilots who fail
to attune spontaneously to the readings on the instrument panel. And so do
those who, like most of us, are often blocked by gambler's‐fallacy inclinations
from seeing the probabilistic indications of a coin's lack of bias.
When people are affected by the lack of inferential pop‐out then they
may believe or know that a certain conclusion follows from such and such
premisses but they will not see the premisses as supporting the conclusion.
They may register that the premisses provide support, as we might say,
but they will not register the support itself. They may retain inferential
judgment, being capable of policing and drilling themselves to draw suitable
conclusions, but they will lack inferential perception. Not having access to
inferential pop‐out, they will be inferentially disabled.
Returning now to the case of rich physicalism, what I want to suggest is
that the reason it is an unsatisfying sort of doctrine is related to the fact
that we have no experience of inferential pop‐out in this area. Suppose that
we believe in the sort of physicalism sketched and accept that the ways
things physically are with any one of us entails, as an a priori matter, that
we are phenomenally thus and so. It is true that we will not be able to derive
the phenomenal from the physical, not being in a position to survey all the
relevant physical facts. But there is also a second problem that is bound to
bother us. This is, that we will have no sense whatsoever of what it would
be to inspect physical premisses and be driven by them to a phenomenal
conclusion. We will have no sense that given an exposure to all the relevant
physical facts, therefore, inferential pop‐out would spontaneously display the
phenomenal configuration that those facts sustain.
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In the cases mentioned earlier, there are different reasons for the lack of
inferential pop‐out. In the modus ponens example, the cause of the problem
is a cognitive disability of a kind we can imagine but rarely experience. In the
example of the trainee pilot, the cause is a lack of training and habituation,
where this is compounded by the distraction of rival proprioceptive cues.
In the probabilistic example, the cause is a well‐known form of intellectual
confusion: instead of considering the chance of this toss being a heads, I
consider the  (p. 180 ) chance of having a long run of heads in which this is
the last toss. But another reason why I might lack inferential pop‐out in a
certain instance, or lack even a sense of its likelihood or possibility, is the
absence of any exposure to the sort of inference involved. And this, I think, is
the problem that is more or less bound to affect us in the physicalist case.
According to the physicalism sketched, we are invited to imagine a state that
functions in the representational manner of an experience and, in particular,
that functions in such a way that I, the subject, can form beliefs about the
properties‐as‐experienced that it represents as present and presented. We
are invited, more specifically, to consider the physical set‐up in virtue of
which such a representational state might materialize. And then we are told
that could we survey the details of that physical set‐up, we would be able
to see that the state in question would have such and such a phenomenal
profile; there is something in particular it would be like to instantiate it: this,
in the way that there is something in particular it is like to see red.
In order for this claim to gain a satisfying grip on our imagination, we
would have to be acquainted with some examples or analogies where the
satisfaction of a physical‐cum‐functional antecedent of the kind envisaged
here leaves us with something akin to the phenomenal experience that it
is said to entail. But this, alas, is not something that we are even remotely
positioned to enjoy. We may believe with the strongest possible degree
of conviction that were we to be physically configured thus and so then
that would ensure, just by virtue of what the notion of a phenomenal state
involves, that we would be phenomenally primed in this or that fashion. But
we can have little or no sense of this being an inferential inevitability. We
cannot begin to imagine what the inferential pop‐out would look like.
The analogy with the Mona Lisa backs up this analysis, for the striking thing
in that case is, as mentioned, that we all know what it is for the addition
of dot after dot suddenly to give rise to a figure. But a closer analogy is
provided by heliocentrism. When Copernicus and Galileo argued for the
hypothesis that the earth rotates every twenty‐four hours, they did not deny
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that for all our perceptions tell us at any point on the earth, the sun moves
across the sky in the course of the day. On the contrary, of course, they
argued that given any particular position on a rotating earth, and given any
particular time of year, the sun would be bound to describe such and such
a perceptual trajectory across the sky. They did not derive that trajectory
for any location on earth, or any time of the year, of course, because the
number of physical facts to be enumerated and surveyed in such a derivation
would be vast and unmanageable. But still, they had little or no trouble in
convincing most people that the heliocentric hypothesis was not  (p. 181 )
confounded by the sight of the sun moving across the sky; with the help
of some auxiliary hypotheses from optics, that sight could be derived from
within the hypothesis itself.
Galileo had an easy success on this front, if not equal success in actually
persuading people of the truth of his hypothesis, because everyone is
familiar with an analogous case. Everyone is familiar with the experience of
occupying a frame of visual reference that moves indiscernibly in relation
to another object, where it is the other object that appears to move, not the
person's own frame. The experience is common in any railway station or, to
take an analogy available in Galileo's own time, on any harbour or river. As
the moving train or boat can seem to provide evidence that it is other things
that are moving, so it is easy to let people see that a rotating earth might
seem to provide evidence that the sun moves across the sky.
The problem that I see in the physicalist case is that not only are we unable
to survey all the physical premisses that might entail the presence of
a phenomenal state. Even worse, we have no inferential sense of how
the inspection and appreciation of those premisses would give us, as
an irresistible pop‐out, the conclusion that in such and such a physical
configuration such and such a phenomenal profile would inevitably
materialize. The lack of this inferential sense is even worse because, as the
heliocentric case suggests, the inability to survey all the relevant physical
premisses would not be much of a problem if we could see how we might
be inferentially moved by any such premisses to endorse a phenomenal
conclusion. In the heliocentric case we have a perceptual sense of the
support offered by the hypothesis for the appearance of the sun moving. In
the physicalist case, we have absolutely nothing of the sort.
What might provide us with the pop‐out, or the sense of what a pop‐out
would be like, that we are lacking? If the heliocentric case offers a reliable
parallel, then we would need experience of the kind that would make it
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possible to simulate the instantiation of the physical states and see, on that
basis, that it is bound to give rise to the corresponding phenomenal profile.
The analogous experience is available in the heliocentric case, but not in
this.
In order to simulate what it would be like to view a relatively stationary
sun from an indiscernibly rotating earth, we draw on our experiences
with carriages or boats or trains. We know what it is like to take a moving
platform as a stable frame of visual reference, given that this happens
in such common experiences. And hence we know what to do in order
to envisage the analogue with a rotating earth; we merely put the earth
imaginatively in the role that trains and boats and carriages sometimes
have for us. When we do this, of  (p. 182 ) course, we find as a result of the
simulation that in imagination the sun will appear to move across the sky.
We cannot do anything of this kind, however, in the physicalist case. We
may be convinced that to look red is just to have the look that a suitably
functioning experience would enable us to identify and we may be able to
argue for this on a variety of grounds. But we will not be able to drive the
point home in the manner of heliocentrists. We will not be able to give it
imaginative vindication by simulating how it would be to undergo a suitably
functioning experience and by finding that it would be to have the things
experienced look red in the familiar way.
Why can't we do this? The simulatory move available in the heliocentric
case involves being able to simulate an experience under one fairly austere
specification and then finding, through the exercise of that ability, that the
experience also satisfies a richer specification. We are able to simulate
viewing a relatively stationary sun from an indiscernibly moving earth and,
simulating the experience under that description, we find that it satisfies
another: it is an experience as of a sun that moves in the opposite direction
to the direction of the earth's rotation.
The resources that make simulation possible in this case are lacking in
the physicalist scenario; say, in the case involving the perception as of
something red. Here we would need to be able to simulate having an
experience with a certain functional profile, under that relatively austere
description, and we would want to be able to find that the simulation delivers
the familiar experience as of something red. But we do not know what
it would be like, described as such, to have an experience with a certain
functional profile. We lack the sorts of analogues provided in the other case
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by trains and boats and carriages. And so we cannot even begin to get the
simulatory exercise under way.
The block to our achieving a simulatory, imaginative vindication of
physicalism may be fairly contingent. Technological aids may yet make it
possible for people to be able to simulate having experiences with certain
functional profiles; and such aids may serve in the confirmation of physicalist
ideas. The experience of moving pictures—films or ‘movies’—has made us
familiar with the fact that as we see scenes succeed one another at smaller
and smaller intervals, we begin to see motion and change. Thus we can
simulate the effect of more or less static perceptions being registered at
smaller and smaller intervals and we can see how, on that physical base, a
phenomenal experience as of motion might materialize and ‘akinetopsia’ or
motion‐blindness be avoided (Pettit 2004c). The problem, however, is that
for whatever contingent reasons, this is a very special case and there is no
analogous sort of aid to simulation available for phenomenal experiences in
general.
(p. 183 ) If this line of argument is right, then even if we embrace the rich
sort of physicalism sketched in the previous section, we should not expect
that this will leave us with the sense of intellectual satisfaction that parallel
doctrines can provide elsewhere. Our position as physicalists is like that in
which heliocentrists would find themselves were we human beings incapable,
for whatever reason, of simulating how a relatively stable sun would look
from the presumptively unmoving platform of a rotating earth. While being
incapable of pulling off that imaginative feat, we might still believe that
the way the sun looks is capable in principle of being derived from the
heliocentric truths, combined with truths about our perceptual dispositions.
But we would have to recognize that for reasons related to our simulatory
limitations, we could never give ourselves an imaginative sense of how the
derivation goes; we would have to live without any sense of inferential pop‐
out.
One final note. I have been trying to show that the rich physicalism
supported by the intentionalist line of argument rehearsed in the last section
is likely to be less than fully satisfying, because of the simulatory gap. But
the lesson is not limited, of course, to the intentionalist form of physicalism.
For even if the phenomenal character of experience is directly fixed by some
of its physical features, not just via the fixing of experiential content, still
the same sort of problem is bound to arise. We will be unable to simulate
what it is to have an experience with those features and so unable to see,
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at the level of concrete imagination, what it will be to have an experience
with such and such a phenomenal character. The problem of the simulatory
gap extends to every form of rich physicalism; it is not confined to the
intentionalist variety.
Conclusion
The nineteenth‐century Danish philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard (1980:
43), famously complained that the systematic philosopher is like a prince
who builds a palace and then lives beside it in a shack. The argument here
suggests that there is a certain justice in his complaint (Pettit 2004b).
Although our overall world‐view will shift with conversion from a non‐
physicalist to a physicalist point of view, and although this shift may have
an impact on various of our commitments and attitudes, it is not the case
that the change will transform the way phenomenal experiences present
themselves. Phenomenal experiences will not shift for us so that we can see
them as the precipitate of our functional, ultimately physical organization;
they will not shift in the way heliocentrism shifts our sense of the sun's
apparent motion. The simulatory gap means that  (p. 184 ) they will retain the
distinctive, sui generis character that has always seemed to mark a break
with the merely physical.
The problem that affects phenomenal experience is parallel, so I think, to a
problem that arises equally with normative experience and thought (Pettit
2000). Just as the functional organization of some of our experiences makes
them phenomenal, by my view, so the organization of other experiences
makes them normative: makes them into experiences as of rules imposing
normative demands upon us (Pettit 2000, Pettit 2002, Part I). But the story
that makes sense of the phenomenology of rule‐following, like the story
that makes sense of phenomenal experience, is equally subject to the
problem of the simulatory gap. I argued in the normative case that if we
were to develop such and such dispositions, treat those dispositions in
such and such a manner, and engage with one another's dispositions in
that mode of treatment, then we would each have the experience as of
rules imposing themselves upon us. But here, as in the phenomenal case,
we lack the resources required for simulating what it would be like for the
antecedent of that conditional to be fulfilled. And so the claim that is made in
the physicalist account of rule‐following, like the claim made in the account
of phenomenal experience, will not deliver the sort of satisfaction we might
have hoped for.
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Perhaps there is something inherently frustrating, then, about philosophical
problems like those that arise with phenomenal and normative experience.
And perhaps the frustration with which the best reductive theories are going
to leave us is what explains why those problems have such a perennial
character. The simulatory gap may not be just a local difficulty that arises for
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Notes:
(1) On the tricky issues that arise here see Braddon‐Mitchell 2003.
(2) For an argument that the modal intuition of independence and this
epistemic intuition of independence are actually in deep tension, not
mutually boosting, see McGeer 2003.
(3) The best known example of such a view is descriptivism and one well‐
known exponent of that view is Jackson 1999. But there are other, strictly
non‐descriptivist versions of the view as well. See Pettit 2004a and Pettit &
Stoljar 2004. On different views of conceivability see Gendler and Hawthorne
2002.
(4) Stoljar 2001 argues that there is a sort of ignorance, associated with
missing a concept, that may well affect our best efforts in this area.
(5) For all the present argument requires, everyone may have his or her own
conception, or different conceptions may be associated with different sub‐
groups in the linguistic community. See Chalmers and Jackson 2001.
(6) I assume that the conceptions driving one's use of the terms will show up
in a consideration of possible cases; one will see what one's conceptions are
so far as one can tell apart the cases where the term would apply from the
cases where it wouldn't.
(7) The position sketched here corresponds with what Chalmers 1996
describes as Type B materialism. It is represented with many variations in a
range of recent authors. As Daniel Stoljar has made clear to me, however,
one may adopt the sort of semantics associated with the position without
taking the rather easy line on conceivability mentioned in the text. One may
think, like for example Kripke 1980, that there is a much richer sense to
finding something conceivable than that of not finding it a priori knowable
that it does not hold; and so one may not be able to dismiss the clash of
claims so easily after all.
(8) Why only ‘broadly’? Because one can believe that terms are conception‐
driven and not in the traditional sense count as a descriptivist of the kind
that Chalmers and Jackson are taken to be; one can hold, for example,
that the availability of the conceptions whereby one's terms are driven
presupposes a causal contact with the world of the kind that non‐
descriptivists privilege. See Pettit 2004a and Pettit and Stoljar 2004.
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(9) In the tickle case, I can go wrong in locating the tickling (on my back)
and in characterizing the tickling (as a tickling); the experience is resistant
to correction in those dimensions but we do not treat it as incorrigible. Is the
pain experience of a part of my body as hurting equally corrigible, if resistant
to correction? I think so. I continue to feel pain even as I recognize that the
location—say, a phantom arm—is non‐existent and that there cannot be any
hurt to ascribe there. I am wrong in experiencing the arm as hurting, then, as
I am wrong in experiencing my back as being tickled. But I am still, of course,
in pain. It is the fact of having an experience of the arm as hurting, not the
fact that there is a real arm that hurts, that means I am in pain.
(10) In Pettit 2003 I express this thought by saying that the experience
overtly has various effects on me. Notice that what is involved need not
require the subject to have the very sophisticated thought that there is an
object present and that object is causally responsible for this independently
individuated experience pace Searle 1983. Seeing an object as presented
amounts to seeing the presenting of the object, as well as seeing the object
itself; it is like seeing the movement of the seconds hand of a clock as well as
the hand itself.
(11) As I stress in that paper, the sort of functionalist story I accept is broadly
in the spirit of writers in the ‘enactive’ or ‘sensorimotor’ tradition. See
Thompson 1995, Hurley 1998, Clark 1999, Myin 2001, Myin and O'Regan
2002, Noe 2002, and O'Regan and Noe 2002. I believe that many of the
functional connections that fix content have to be learned as a matter of
maturational skill, as those in that tradition stress, and that the subject
will normally have a grasp, however implicit or practical in character, of
what those connections are. This grasp of the connections involved may be
necessary if the content to be fixed is, as I put it in the text, a content for the
subject, not just a content in the subject.
(12) See Block 2002, where he explicitly countenances this sort of
judgmental ‘access’ to experience. The access described there is precisely
the sort envisaged in the text, where that is not the case with the sort of
access described in an earlier version of the paper (Block 1997).
(13) There are two aspects of the fit between the picture sketched and
empirical science that are emphasized in that paper. First, the picture fits
nicely with the findings of Ivo Kohler 1964, that people compensate for
disturbances induced by wearing colour‐distorting glasses, and that when
they compensate—when they regain their old colour‐discriminating skills—
they report that things look exactly the way they used to look before. And
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second, the most surprising aspect of the picture—that the appearances of
colour and the like do not cause our responses but materialize in virtue of
those responses—connects nicely with the growing neuroscientific emphasis
on the fact that the brain often ‘works behind the subject's back’ (Gazzaniga,
Ivry and Mangun 1998), with effects being visually induced in a manner that
is independent of visual judgment (Milner & Goodale 1995). On this latter
point, see Clark 2001.
(14) This paper was sketched and written over a period in 2003 when I
was co‐teaching a graduate seminar on consciousness with Sean Kelly, in
Princeton. I owe him and the other participants in the seminar a debt of
gratitude for a host of matters that I came to understand better as a result
of our discussions. I am also grateful to Sean Kelly, to Frank Jackson, Victoria
McGeer, Michael Smith and Daniel Stoljar, for a number of very helpful
conversations on the topics covered. Finally, I thank Ian Ravenscroft for very
useful and insightful comments on the penultimate draft.
